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Abstract:
One of the most striking empirical patterns of horse race betting markets is the favorite-
longshot bias: Bets on favorites have dramatically higher expected returns than bets on 
longshots. The literature offers a couple of different, though not mutually exclusive, 
explanations based on risk preferences and probability perceptions. This article adds a new
possible explanation: The favorite-longshot bias may be the rational answer of an honest 
audience to a simple, but highly lucrative cheating opportunity of insiders. We provide 
anecdotal evidence that the type of cheating we model here really takes place. What is more, 
by employing a large scale German data set we are able to demonstrate that the pattern of the 
favourite-longshot bias changes as the opportunity of cheating vanishes. The changes we 
observe are in accord with the cheating model we suggest. 
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1. Introduction
One of the main findings of empirical racetrack research is the favorite-longshot bias (FLB). 
Empirically it is found that bets on longshots on average lose much more money than bets on 
favorites (e.g. Griffith 1949; Weitzman 1965; Ali 1977; Williams and Paton 1997; Jullien and 
Salanié 2000). While the probability that the longshot will win is well below that of the 
favorite its payoff is of course higher. But as it turns out, it is not high enough to fully 
compensate for the lower probability of winning. Empirical studies have shown that the FLB 
exists in North America (e.g. Snyder 1978), the UK (e.g. Bruce and Johnson 2000), Australia 
(e.g. Tuckwell 1983), and Germany (Winter and Kukuk 2006). The FLB seems to be a stable 
phenomenon over time. The empirical literature documents no relevant timing effect, since 
the FLB has been found as early as 1949 by Griffith (1949) as well as late as 2006 by Winter 
and Kukuk (2006).
While earlier studies dealt mainly with pari-mutuel markets, the FLB has later also been 
found with respect to bookmaker odds as well (Dowie 1976; Tuckwell 1983; Henery 1985, 
Williams/Paton 1997; Jullien/Salanié 2000; Bruce/Johnson 2000, Law/Peel 2002). All studies 
mentioned above concentrate only on win bets.
The literature has offered a variety of explanations of the FLB. These range from risk-loving 
betting strategies of rational, purely financially motivated gamblers at the one extreme to 
betting as a pure consumption activity with a higher consumption value of betting on 
longshots. A more recent approach is to explain the FLB by information deficiencies. If for 
example there are noise traders backing horses evenly, while informed traders back only the 
good horses, then the longshots will be backed by too much money given their true chances of 
winning and the favorites are underbet. Especially the risk-love and the misperception models 
have triggered much empirical work. Especially recent evidence is more in favor of the 
misperception explanation.
However, neither analytical nor any empirical work seems to be available on the likely effects 
of cheating by manipulation of a race’s outcome. This paper is a first effort in this direction. 
The main finding is that the FLB may be a rational response of uninformed outsiders to a very 
simple but eventually highly lucrative cheating opportunity of insiders. We provide anecdotal 
evidence that the modus operandi of cheating we model below really is put to use at times. 
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We then present evidence that the pattern of the FLB changes significantly when the 
opportunity of cheating is absent.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the main explanations for the FLB offered in 
the literature so far are reviewed. Section 3 outlines the simple model of cheating and derives 
the empirically testable hypotheses. Section 4 reviews some anecdotal evidence on race 
manipulation in general and some examples for the cheating technique we discuss here. We 
then show that the pattern of the FLB in a large scale German data set depends on the 
existence vs. non-existence of cheating opportunities. Some caveats of our theoretical as well 
as empirical results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Explanations of the FLB
The literature offers a variety of explanations for the FLB. One of the most prominent 
explanations of the FLB suggested in the theoretical literature is the assumption of 
homogenous bettors with a preference for risk. Bettors can then be represented by Mr. 
Avmart, the average man at the race track (Weitzman 1965) and the market outcome can be 
derived from this man’s equilibrium behavior. In a mean-variance framework of expected 
utility the FLB has even been shown to be the equilibrium market outcome (Quandt 1986). 
Market data has then been employed to estimate the utility function of a representative bettor. 
Of course, when the FLB was present in the data, the representative bettor showed a 
preference for risk indeed (see e.g. Ali 1977; Jullien/Salaniè 2000).
While Quandt (1986) focuses on a mean-variance framework, others have argued that bettors 
may have a positive preference for skewness (see e.g. Bird et al. 1987, Golec and Tamarkin 
1998, Cain et al. 2002). Since returns on longshots are most highly skewed, longshots would 
be backed disproportionately, again resulting in the FLB.
Another idea to explain the FLB is to assume that bettors do not mainly follow financial 
goals. Here, gambling boils down to a consumption activity like spending money on an opera 
ticket. If this would be true, then it would be futile to discuss risk preferences in this context. 
In this line of argument it has been suggested that bettors may primarily play for fun and that 
it is more fun to bet on longshots (Thaler and Ziemba 1988). The authors suggest that 
“bragging rights” can only be earned by picking a longshot correctly. 
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On the supply side of the bookmaker market, it has been argued that bookmakers face the 
strongest price competition for bets on favorites but are less constrained for longshots. They 
are therefore able to shorten longshots’ odds disproportionately, resulting in the FLB (Henery 
1985). Bookmakers in contrast to organizers of pari-mutuel markets are financially 
endangered by inside traders. They are extremely vulnerable by positive inside information on 
longshots. They therefore shorten longhots’ odds even more (Shin 1991, 1992, 1993). The 
incidence of insider activity is well documented in bookmaker markets (e.g. Crafts 1985, Cain 
et al. 2001). The strategic pricing decision of bookmakers is only a partial explanation of the 
FLB, though, since the bias is present in pari-mutuel markets as well. 
Another explanation is that bettors simply overestimate the probability of winning for 
longshots (Thaler and Ziemba 1988). This could be considered a Kahneman-Tversky (1979) 
type of (erroneous?) probability weighting (Hurley and McDonough 1995). This explanation 
has been criticized on the grounds that races are frequent and data availability is good, 
offering a sound opportunity to update beliefs and arrive at correct estimates (Sauer 1998). 
Still, Jullien and Salanié (2000) found a Kahneman-Tversky type of utility concept to fit their 
data better than rank-dependent utility or expected utility models. This latter result is 
corroborated by Snowberg and Wolfers (2006).
Another type of explanation of the FLB assumes that there are at least two different types of 
bettors. For example, Sobel and Raines (2003) use pari-mutuel data from UK greyhound 
races. Their prior is that the better informed bettors gamble more regularly, bet more on exotic 
bets and their average bet is higher as compared to more casual bettors. Casual bettors are 
expected to gamble especially at weekends, while the serious bettors gamble more evenly 
over the week. Sobel and Raines (2003, p. 375, Table 1) show that attendance is indeed much 
higher at weekend races, that at weekends more of the total betting volume is bet on simple 
bets and that the average bet is lower. What is more, they find that the percentage of money 
wagered on the favorites is lower at weekends, suggesting that the casual gamblers spend too 
much money on longshots. This composition effect even leads to a reversal of the FLB at 
weekday races. It is found that the longshots perform much better than the favorites and that 
the extreme longshots even provide for a positive average return (Sobel and Raines, 2003, 
379, Table 3). Since this market outcome is presumably driven by informed bettors, they 
exhibit risk averting behavior. Almost no bias is found at weekends. When it comes to 
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combined bets, the subjective calculation of wining probabilities becomes quite complex. 
When confronted with the combined bets, even informed bettors may not be able to do these 
calculations correctly. Indeed, it is found that for combined bets the usual FLB occurs. Sobel
and Raines (2003, 382) conclude that the cause of the FLB is rather due to a lack of 
understanding than to a preference for risk. So the FLB is expected to occur whenever the 
audience is dominated by casual gamblers or when bets become too complicated. Coleman 
(2004) suggests that there may not only be better informed bettors but rather risk averse 
insiders with even positive expected returns from gambling. These insiders are confronted 
with a larger group of risk loving gamblers who back longshots and have negative expected 
returns. Both papers, Sobel and Raines (2003) as well as Coleman (2004) suggest that the 
FLB may vanish or be even reversed as the composition of the betting population changes 
from more to less outsiders or uninformed bettors.
Information problems are also at the heart of a transaction costs argument (Hurley and 
McDonough, 1995). They suggest that as transaction cost like the track take and costs of 
acquiring information on horses’ capabilities increase, betting will become less informed. 
This results in underbet favorites and overbet longshots, i.e. the FLB. The information costs 
argument is empirically supported by Williams and Paton (1997). The information costs as 
well as the transaction costs arguments are backed by Smith et al. (2006).
In a sense, the cheating explanation offered below is in the tradition of the misperceptions and 
information problems explanations. The difference it that those models just assume that there 
are given informational problems while the cheating model assumes that the informational 
problems are intentionally “produced” by a cheater. The advantage of the latter approach is 
that the conditions under which cheating and therefore informational problems may occur can 
be identified quite easily.
3. The simple model of cheating
Assume that there are n horses in a race with given, objective probabilities of winning, 
denoted by nipi ,...,1, = . Probabilities are common knowledge and fully reflect the horses’ 
true capabilities. However, these probabilities may be subject to manipulation by an insider 
like a jockey or a trainer. In what follows, it is assumed that collusion of insiders is not 
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feasible, so that each insider is restricted to manipulate only her own horse and eventually bet 
accordingly. What is more, it is assumed that there will be only one cheat per race at most so 
that cheaters can ignore the behavior of other potential cheaters. The model is further 
restricted to analyze only cheats that make horses slower. This is not to say that there are no 
manipulations of horses intended to make them faster. But making them slower is likely to be 
performed easier and harder to detect. Slowing a horse down may therefore be an extremely 
comfortable way of earning money without raising to much concern. However, even if the 
cheater would be able to guarantee that her horse, say horse j, will not win, there are no “not-
win” bets available at the tracks or at the bookmakers. Direct exploitation of reduced winning 
probabilities such is impossible. But eventually there are now win bets on other horses which 
have positive expected returns. We will derive sufficient conditions under which profitable 
betting opportunities occur. 
We start by introducing the notation. Let ib  be the amount of money wagered on horse i by 
outsiders. Normalize betting volume so that  ==ni ib1 1. Thus, ib  is the percentage of the 
betting pool wagered on horse i. The pay out q to the winning bets is the total pool of wagers 
minus the track take, i.e. = =ni ibtq 1)1( . Since  ==ni ib1 1 by definition q just becomes 
)1( tq = . Since the pay out must be shared proportionally by those who bet on the winning 
horse, the pay out ratio, i.e. the amount of money paid back for each unit wagered on the 
winning horse is given by the gross odds O, which for horse k are simply calculated as 
[ ] kkni ik btbbtO /)1(/)1( 1 == = (1) 
 
The total profit of the bets on the winning horse is given by kkkkk bqbObr == . The 
expected profit iR  of the bets on horse i is thus iiii btpbqp = )1(  before manipulation. 
Let iP  be the winning probability of horse i after the chances of horse j eventually have been 
manipulated. The expected profit iR  then becomes iii btPR = )1( . Even after manipulation 
the sum of all expected profits must be minus one times the track take, i.e. 
tbtPR ni iini i = = == 11 ])1([
Proposition 1: If tbj > and 0=jP there exists an i, jini = ;,...,1 , so that 0>iR .
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Proof: Assume tbj >  and 0=jP . Since 
 += = ==
n
jii iijj
n
i ii btPbtPbtPt ,11 ])1([)1(])1([  and 0=jP  one obtains:
0])1([
,1 >= = tbbtP jn jii ii (2)
However, if it is now assumed that 0	iR  for all i, jini = ;,...,1 , then 
0])1([][
,1,1 	 = ==
n
jii ii
n
jii i btPR , contradicting (2). This proves that at least one of 
the sRi '  must be strictly positive.
Now, let a win bet on horse k have positive expected returns, i.e. 0)1( >= kkk btPR . 
Outsiders have already wagered the finite amount kb  on horse k. An additional, infinitely 
small bet on horse i will have no effects on the odds so that the additional bet also has positive 
expected returns. This proves that the downward cheat 0=jP offers profit opportunities for 
the cheater. The profit opportunities for the cheater improve as the betting volume increases. 
This is because higher betting volume diminishes the effects of additional bets on the odds. At 
high volume, the cheater could also bet high stakes without reducing the expected returns of 
her bets by lowering the odds. 
Proposition 1 just proves that there will be a betting opportunity with positive expected 
returns. It does not guarantee that the cheater will be able to make a profit irrespective of the 
race’s outcome. If the cheater is highly risk averse, profits in a given race can not be 
guaranteed, and cheating opportunities are rare, she may still refrain from cheating. However, 
it turns out that when the conditions of Proposition 1 hold, i.e. tbj >  and 0=jP , the cheater 
can construct a portfolio of bets with a positive profit guarantee. 
Proposition 2: If tbj >  and 0=jP  there exists a portfolio of bets that guarantees a 
positive profit. 
Proof: Assume a bettor wants to bet an amount of money on horse i so that if i wins she 
will get one unit of money in return. The amount bet on horse i thus can be interpreted 
as the price for playing a binomial bet that pays 1 if the horse wins and 0 otherwise. 
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Given the money wagered by the outsiders, the price i
  of such a bet on horse i is 
simply:
t
bi
i 
=
1

 (3)
If the bettor buys these binomial bets on all horses except j, then she has to pay the sum 
of all prices, i.e. jni in jii i 


 == == 1,1 . Feeding in (3) yields:
t
b
t
b jni in
jii i 


== == 11
1
,1 
 (4)
Since by definition  ==ni ib1 1 one obtains
t
bj


=
1
1 (5)
It follows 1<  since tbj >  by assumption. What is more, 0=jP  and thus one of the 
horses covered by the portfolio   must win. The portfolio’s payoff will be 1 
irrespective of which horse wins and the price of the portfolio is less than one. If only 
marginal amounts of money are additionally invested in this portfolio, the prices of the 
binomial bets will not change and therefore the additional portfolio will be profitable. 
This completes the proof.
While proposition 2 proves that a profitable marginal portfolio exists, it leaves open to 
question what a guarantee portfolio would yield in absolute figures, given that the cheater 
maximizes her minimum guaranteed profit. 
Proposition 3: Maximization of the guaranteed profit d yields a profit of at least 
2)( tbd j = .
Proof of Proposition 3:
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Let iB  be the amount of money wagered on horse i by the cheater. Betting on all horses 
except j, her profit if k wins will be:

+
+
= =
= n
jii i
kk
n
jii i
kk BBb
Bt
Br
,1
,1 )1)(1( (6)
Since the profit shall be guaranteed, it must be independent of k, i.e. 0>= cri  for all 
jini = ;,...,1 , where c is some constant. Since crr lk ==  for all jlk ,  it follows:
l
n
jii i
ll
n
jii i
l
n
jii i
kk
n
jii i
kk rBBb
Bt
BB
Bb
Bt
Br =
+
+
=
+
+
= =
=
=
=
,1
,1
,1
,1 )1)(1()1)(1( (7)
Simplifying yields:
ll
l
kk
k
Bb
B
Bb
B
+
=
+
(8)
This system of equations for all jlk , can only hold if the cheater’s bets iB  equal the 
outsiders’ bets ib multiplied by a positive constant v, i.e. ii vbB =  for all ji  . In that 
case (6) can be rewritten to

+
+
=

+
+
=
=
=
=
=
n
jii i
kk
n
jii i
k
n
jii i
kk
n
jii i
kk
bv
vbb
bvt
vb
B
Bb
Bt
Br
,1
,1
,1
,1
)1)(1(
)1)(1(
(9)
Substitution of jn jii i bb = = 1,1 , simplifying, and dropping subscript k gives:
)1(
1
))1()(1( 2
j
j bv
v
bvvt
r 
+
+
= (10)
The function )(vrr =  is continuous since v is positive and it is differentiable to any 
degree. The f.o.c. for an optimized multiplier v is:
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0)1(
)(
1
)22(
2
22
=
+
+
+
+
+
=
v
tvbtvvbtv
v
tvbtvtb
dv
dr jjjj (11)
The solutions of equation (11) are [ ] [ ] 1)1()1( 11 = jj bttbv  and 
[ ][ ] 1)1()1( 12 = jj bttbv . Because tbj >  by assumption, simple algebra shows 
that 1v  is positive while 2v  is obviously negative. Since v must be positive, only 1v is a 
feasible solution. Indeed, )( 1vr  must be a maximum. This follows from the observation 
that 0/ >= tbdvdr j  at 0=v . Thus r is increasing as one moves from 0=v  to 1v . It 
can not be decreasing in between since r is continuous and has no other positive 
extremum but 1v . Therefore 1v  characterizes a maximum. 
Lemma 1: 0)( vr for )/()(0 jj tbttbv 		
Proof of Lemma 1:
0)( =vr  has one obvious solution at 0=v . Simple algebra shows that 
)/()( jj tbttbv =  is the only other solution. Since 0/ >= tbdvdr j  at 0=v and 
)(vr  is continuous it immediately follows that 0)( vr  for )/()(0 jj tbttbv 		 .
Q.e.d.
Let dyr =)(  for some y satisfying )/()(0 jj tbttby << . So d is positive and is a 
lower bound for the profit the cheater would be able to obtain. Let 1/ = tby j . Again, 
simple algebra shows that )/()(0 jj tbttby << . Feeding in yv =  in equation (10) 
and simplifying yields:
2)()( tbyr j = (12)
Since )( yr  is a lower bound for the cheater’s guaranteed profit, the proof is completed.
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Next, we introduce a simple stylized version of the favorite-longshot bias. We start by 
observing that if ii bp =  for all i and if there is no cheating, then betting would be totally 
unbiased and all bets would have the same expected returns. Ignoring exact patters the FLB 
just means that ii bp >  for the favorites and jj bp <  for the longshots. Now assume that the 
outsiders’ betting strategy is given by )/1( npzpb iii +=  for all i. The parameter z is a bias 
measure where 0<z produces a favorite-longshot bias, 0=z  represents unbiased betting, 
and 0>z  implies a reversed favorite-longshot bias. In order to guarantee non-negative bets
and bets of 1 at most, z must satisfy [ ])/1/()1();/1/( nppnppz  , where p  is defined 
as the minimum of all spi ' , while p  is the respective maximum and it is assumed that not all 
probabilities are equal. 
By Proposition 3 we have the cheater’s minimum profit being 2)( tbd j = . It follows 
tbdbdd jj 22/ = . This derivative is strictly positive since by assumption tbj > . The more 
money wagered on horse j, the more profitable it becomes to cheat. Now assume that the 
objective winning probability of the cheater’s horse j also satisfies np j /1> , i.e. the horse has 
a higher than average winning probability. This assumption is not hard to justify since only in 
races with a very small number of runners could a horse attract a percentage of total betting 
volume in excess of the percentage of the track take and at the same time have a probability of 
winning that is below average. Given the outsiders’ betting strategy and holding the objective 
winning probabilities constant, the betting volume on horse j is )/1( npzpb jjj += . 
Therefore npdzdb jj /1/ = . The derivative is strictly positive by assumption. If the betting 
volume on horse j increases in z and the cheater’s profits increase in the betting volume, the 
cheater’s profits also increase in z. So if one moves from the favorite-longshot bias via 
unbiased betting to a reversed longshot bias, the profit opportunity of the cheater increases. 
Since all profits of the cheater stem from the outsiders’ bets, outsiders as a group lose less 
money when a favorite-longshot bias is present and lose more if it isn’t. They lose most if 
there is a reversed favorite-longshot bias. The implication is that the FLB may be an 
equilibrium response of outsiders to the possibility of being taken for a ride on the back of the 
cheater’s horse.
However, even if this explanation is valid, then there may still be other forces at work in favor 
of the FLB. This has to be taken into account when proposing empirical tests of the cheating 
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model. Still, appropriate controls may be available. The profitability of cheating hinges on the
assumption that the percentage of money wagered on horse j exceeds the track take. If there is 
a race with no horse meeting this condition, outsiders must not be concerned with cheating. 
Therefore, in races with all horses having odds of ttOi /)1(  , there will be no such 
cheating. If the possibility of cheating is perceived as being important, the FLB should be 
weaker in such races as compared to the other races. To check this conjecture is the main goal 
of our empirical section below. However, there will likely be a strong negative correlation 
between the percentage of money wagered on the single horses and the number of horses in a 
race. So while there is less cheating in bigger races, it may at the same time become more 
difficult for bettors to estimate winning probabilities correctly. The one effect may therefore 
offset the other when it comes to the FLB. It would thus be appropriate to control for the 
number of runners in the field.
The cheating model has not explicitly taken into account techniques of detecting and 
punishing cheaters. It is highly likely that cheating is easier when other good horses are 
around. Suppose an extreme scenario with all horses but that of the potential cheater having
only three legs. Outsider betting on her horse will be heavy but cheating by not winning will 
be definitely detected. On the other hand, if there are other horses around also attracting heavy 
betting, not winning will hardly be considered a cheat. Therefore, cheating will be less likely 
with highly different odds, and will be more likely with at least one horse being in the odds 
range of the potential cheater. Since odds are known, this conclusion can also be tested.
The cheating story also suggests some patterns of organizational responses to the threat of 
cheating. Organizers of pari-mutuel betting markets have at least three techniques to deter 
cheating. The first is to invest in detection technology. The second is to improve the 
composition of races so that all horses in a race attract non trivial fractions of the total pool, 
thereby reducing the probability of single horses attracting more than the take. The third is to 
increase the number of runners per race. Since cheating is most profitable at high betting 
volume, one would expect a positive correlation between the total betting volume and the 
number of runners. If the composition technique is used one would observe a negative 
correlation of betting volume and variance of betting fractions across horses. Investments in 
detection technology on the other hand should be expected only at tracks that regularly attract 
high betting volume. One therefore would expect cross track investments in detection 
technology to be positively correlated with cross track betting volume.
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4. Empirical evidence
Before we present our own evidence based on betting market data we briefly review some 
direct anecdotal evidence on cheating. For reasons of better readability we document the 
sources we used in the appendix. Manipulation of races does not seem to be a contemporary 
invention. As Higgins (2006) notes, one ancient writer reported that manipulation of a chariot
horse could be punished by crucifixion in Rome. 
Overall, the anecdotal evidence on race manipulation is dominated by reports on doping 
intended to make horses run faster. Besides some drugs only known to specialist, there were 
cases of horses given cocaine, morphine, strychnine, or nowadays even Viagra. The use of so 
called ‘speedballs’ and heroin was quite common in the US after the 1933 legalization of pari-
mutuel betting. It was estimated that about 50% of all horses had a stimulant or anesthetic 
administered before the races at that time (Higgins 2006). Anabolic steroids were also used 
but only some time ago since they are easy to detect nowadays. Ethorphine, also known as 
‘elephant juice’, is a tranquilizer that if applied correctly is very stimulating and has produced
some scandals especially in the 1980s. Since some horses seem to be quite nervous before 
races, they are eventually treated with tranquilizers or they are even given vodka to calm them 
down. Then there is caffeine, EPO, ACE, and Beta Blockers. ‘Blue Magic’ (propantheline 
bromide) helps to relax muscles and increase the blood flow and is suspected to have been 
used mainly in harness horse racing. Butazolidin and other pain killers like snake-venom 
make injured horses perform better.
When it comes to slow horses down, there is much less material available. Higgins (2006) 
relates the story of a stable lad having been hanged on Newmarket Heath in 1812 for 
poisoning a horse with arsenic. One more recent technique is that of “sponging”: sponges are 
put in the horse’s nostrils to make breathing harder. Without getting enough air, horses will of 
course slow down. What is more, sponges can not be detected by doping tests based on the 
horse’s saliva, urine or blood. Slowing down horses by application of forbidden substances 
also seems to have taken place. Another technique of cheating is to exchange horses. Though 
we were able to identify only one case, there may have been other undetected cases of 
exchanged horses. By exchanging one horse for another, the audience may think to bet on a 
favourite while the horse actually running is a look-alike longshot. A funny technique, since 
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one obviously can not ask a horse its name. From an ethical point of view exchanging horses 
may be considered the least problematic of all cheating techniques since at least no harm is 
done to the horses. 
Though we restrict our analysis to a static one time cheat it may be noted that slowing a horse 
down could offer a further dynamic advantage to the cheater: The audience starts to perceive 
the horse of being of inferior quality and stops to bet on it. By abandoning the negative 
doping or other slowing down techniques the horse suddenly becomes fast again, offering 
new profitable betting opportunities to the cheater. 
While the anecdotal evidence on pure slowing down cases is rather scarce, the scarceness can 
have two different explanations. One is that this type of cheating just does not happen very 
often. The other explanation would be that if clever administered it is almost impossible to 
detect. For example, a horse may not receive a proper amount of training or it is just not fed 
enough before a race. No doping test will ever detect such techniques. 
Last but not least, there seem to have been some successful attempts of race fixing. To fix a 
race means to fully determine the outcome of a race. Fixing thus is only possible by collusive 
behavior of all participants. Race fixing proves most profitable if the favorites are made to 
lose and the longshots are made to win. So race fixing is just a collusive combination of 
slowing some horses down and speeding others up. Given its collusive character, it is not 
surprising that a lot of fixing cases became known. They seem to be quite common all over 
the world. 
To summarize, anecdotal evidence on simply slowing horses down is rather scarce. That 
scarceness may be due to the fact that slowing down is a rare event. It may also be due to the 
fact that slowing down can be easily administered, is hard to detect, and does not require 
collusive efforts. In the latter case, i.e. if slowing down is done more often, an informationally
efficient betting market could eventually provide some better clues than a search for anecdotal 
evidence. So betting market data is what we check next.
We employ a large scale data set of betting data on some 300,000 horses running in 35,608 
races run at 13 different German tracks between January 2000 and March 2004. Data were 
provided by TROT-ONLINE, an Internet-based information broker for German pari-mutuel 
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harness horse races. For a more detailed description of the data set see Kukuk and Winter 
(2006).
The take at German tracks is between 20% and 30%, depending on the track and the type of 
bet offered. It is higher than in most other countries, where the take is typically less than 20%. 
This difference is due in part to the high German federal tax on horse bets, which alone is 
already 16.67%. Straight win bets typically trigger the lowest take, while the take for 
combined bets is typically highest. We have no specific information on the take for the 
individual races. 
We classify horses with respect to their favorite or longshot statuses according to the odds
prevailing in the betting market. We thus simply define the favorite as the horse with the 
lowest odds. In that case, any horse that is ranked first in the odds is the favorite by definition, 
and no two horses in a race can be in the same category. One can break eventual ties in the 
odds by randomly assigning the respective ranks to the horses. We can then calculate the 
average odds across races for each rank and then can use these rankings to calculate the 
winning probabilities implied by the odds, which we can compare to the average empirical 
winning probability of that specific rank. Table 1 presents the results for the win bets. 
Table 1: Probabilities and returns for win and show bets (taken from Kukuk and Winter 2006)
Odds Average Probability of Winning Return (%)
category i1 Odds2 # Races3    # Winners4  Empirical5     Implied6 Win bet7
1 0.99 0 (35608) 16231 0.456* †  0.409* -16.56*
2 2.85 0 (35608) 7828 0.220* ‡  0.215 * -23.98*
3 5.29 1 (35608) 4574 0.128* †  0.135 * -29.23*
4 8.86 34 (35607) 2789 0.078* †  0.090 * -36.46+
5 14.34 328 (35573) 1826 0.051* †  0.060 * -39.10+
6 23.56 2019 (35245) 1156 0.033*  †  0.041 * -43.07+
7 39.01 5998 (33226) 704 0.021* †  0.028 * -47.37
8 61.43 10012 (27228) 349 0.013* †  0.019 * -50.41
9 87.58 8882 (17216) 146 0.008 †  0.015 * -53.54
10 123.92 7210 (8334) 67 0.008 †  0.011 * -42.56
11 146.88 627 (1124) 7 0.006 ‡  0.011 + -34.56
12 126.29 252 (497) 4 0.008 0.010 *    13.74
13 151.92 55 (245) 1 0.004 0.009 * -72.45
14 194.55 32 (190) 2 0.011+ 0.007 * -36.11+
15 218.16 23 (158) 0 0.000 0.006 * -100.00
16 880.92 26 (135) 0 0.000 0.002 + -100.00
17 926.46 42 (109) 0 0.000 0.001 -100.00
18 922.30 65 (67) 0 0.000 0.001 -100.00
19 169.05 2 (2) 0 0.000 0.005 -100.00
Notes 1
 Odds rank; favorites ranked lowest. We break ties in the odds by order of appearance in data set.
  Alternative random selection does not change results.
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2
 Average odds of all horses in category i. The average odds of category 19 are lower than those in
  category 18. This result is not an error. In the 65 races with exactly 18 horses, most of the horses
  ranked 18th had extremely high odds.
3
 Number of races with exactly i horses. Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of races with at
  least i horses. 
4
 Number of winners in odds rank i. The sum of the numbers of all winners exceeds the number of
  races due to 76 races with deadheads (ties).
5
 Actual winning probability of horses of odds rank i. * (+) indicates that the difference in winning
  probabilities between category i and i+1 is significant at the 1% (10%) level.
  (one sided two-sample t-test, unequal variances).
6
 Average winning probability implied by the odds for horses of odds rank i. * (+) defined as in
  column 5. † (‡) indicates that the difference between implied and empirical winning probabilities
  within category i is significant at the 1% (10%) level.
  (two sided two-sample t-test, unequal variances).
7
 Average return of win bets on all horses in category i. The positive return in category 12 is due
  to a single outlier that paid 433.4 to 1. * (+) indicates that the return difference between 
  category i and i+1 is significant at the 1% (10%) level.
  (one sided two-sample t-test, unequal variances). 
As can be inferred from the return column in Table 1, the FLB is strongly present in German 
harness horse racing.
We now divide the data into two subsets. Subset 1 is the set of races in which slowing down 
the favorite and betting on all other horses according to the betting strategy described in 
propositions 2 and 3 of Section 3 would have been profitable. Subset 2 is the set of races in 
which slowing down the favorite would not have been profitable. Since we have no 
information on the actual track takes, we employ th  midrange of the 20% to 30% interval of 
actual takes. This corresponds to a cut point of 3.0 for the odds. Therefore, all races that 
include at least one horse with odds of 3.0 or lower define subset 1 and all races that have all 
horses with odds of more than 3.0 define subset 2.
In Figure 1 the average return of the first ten favorite categories are plotted against the log of 
the corresponding average odds. For subset 1 a clear FLB is obtained whereas the 2321 races 
in subset 2 (for categories 6 to 10 we have 2318, 2296, 2157, 1673, and 975 races, 
respectively) at least the first seven categories show only a slightly negative slope. Testing for 
equal returns of two subsequent categories (see note 7 of table 1) in subset 1 highly significant 
differences result for the first four favorite categories and moderate significance for the 
following four categories. In subset 2 only the peak of category 3 is significant. 
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Figure 1: Log-odds/return profiles for races with at least one odd less than 3 (subset 1) and 
races with all odds greater than or equal to 3 (subset 2)
Since it is more likely to observe all odds being larger than 3 in races with more horses in a 
next step we consider only races with a given number of horses and divide them into the two 
subsets as above. The resulting average returns of the different favourite categories are 
illustrated in Figure 2 for races with exactly 10 horses. Again we observe a FLB for subset 1 
comprehending 6256 races with significantly falling average returns in the first four 
categories. For subset 2 it even looks like a reversed FLB in the first six categories where 
again only the difference in returns of categories 2 and 3 is significant. Categories 7 to 10 
exhibit falling returns. Analyzing races with 7, 8, or 9 horses, respectively, the results also 
show a FLB for subset 1 and no clear FLB but a more erratic behavior due to lower number of 
races in the respective subsets 2. Using other cutting point odds for separating the two subsets 
we get similar results which for some values are less pronounced. This may reflect the fact 
that the track take differs among different German tracks.
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Figure 2: Log-odds/return profiles for races with exactly 10 horses
The results on an aggregate level show that the favorite horses are underbet if at least the 
lowest odd is below 3 resulting in a FLB as suggested by our theoretical analysis of section 3. 
However, these aggregate results could be driven by some sort of selection process. We 
therefore consider the favorite with the lowest odd in each race and analyze her winning 
probability as a function of the share of the betting pool being wagered on the favorite (b1), 
the difference to the share of the second favorite (b1-b2), the number of horses in the race, and 
two dummy indicators for b1 being greater than a given threshold and the difference (b1-b2) 
being greater than 2, respectively. We run a binary probit regression and allow for non-
linearities in betting share and also for the difference in betting shares. The estimation results 
are recorded in Table 2. Note that the marginal effects and not the parameter estimates are 
reported.
Table 2: Binary probit estimates for dependent variable winning of first favorite
Marginal eff.
dF/dx Std.Err. z P>|z| x-bar
I[(b1-b2)>2] * -.0248461 .0108869 -2.28 0.023 .38166
I[b1>2.5] * .030491 .0132367 2.31 0.021 .161269
b1 4.453453 1.297419 3.43 0.001 .408812
b12 -6.676461 3.107343 -2.15 0.032 .179334
b13 4.270006 2.412985 1.77 0.077 .084027
(b1-b2) -.4264324 .167398 -2.55 0.011 .19501
(b1-b2)2 2.404268 .8477782 2.84 0.005 .05887
(b1-b2)3 -2.307615 1.135549 -2.03 0.042 .022083
# of horses -.002376 .0021222 -1.12 0.263 8.44578
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Log lik. -23054.104
Pseudo R2 0.0606
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0
As expected the favorite’s share of the betting pool is positively linked to the likelihood of
winning. The relationship is first concave up to the inflection point at b1=0.52 and then 
convex. The influence of the difference is estimated to be non-monotonic. It is falling up to 
about (b1 –b2)=0.1 and then increasing until 0.59. Thus, for about one third of the sample 
having differences below 0.1 a small increase in this variable (implying an increase in the 
odds of the second favorite) the chances of winning decrease. Additional to this effect we find 
that if the odds between the first and the second favorite differ by more than 2 the favorite’s 
probability of winning the race is significantly smaller by about 2.5 percentage points. If the 
lowest odd in the race is 2.6 or more the winning probability increases by 3 percentage points. 
According to section 3 this estimated odds threshold translates into a track take of 27.8% 
which corresponds to the finding of Winter and Kukuk (2006, tables 6a, 6b). In other 
specifications using a dummy indicator for odds greater than 2.5 and 2.8, respectively, we 
find similar but slightly less significant results whereas for 2.7 and 2.9, respectively, the 
parameter estimate is only significant at a significance level of 15 %. Other specifications
including weekday dummies, dummies for the number of horses in the race, the size of the 
betting pool, and the prize money as explanatory variables did not obtain significant 
parameter estimates. For the latter two variables this finding might be due to the fact that we 
do not observe those variables for all races. 
5. Some caveats
One obvious caveat of our analysis is that we employ only a partial model. We have therefore 
not provided a complete proof that the FLB is an equilibrium response of outsiders. Rather, 
we have only identified some arguments in favor of the FLB being an equilibrium response. 
For example, our discussion leaves open why then outsiders should at all bet fractions on 
single horses in excess of the track take when this betting behavior triggers cheating. The 
answer may be that by not doing so, betting on favorites could become a positive expected 
return activity. Insiders thus could profit by just backing their favorite horses and cease 
cheating. But then outsiders as a group could lose even more as compared to the cheating 
situation. So while we have not yet developed a complete equilibrium model of cheating, we 
Page 19 of 27
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
20
feel that the technique of cheating we discuss here could be an equilibrium activity of insiders 
and that a more pronounced FLB could be an equilibrium response of outsiders.
The next problem worth mentioning is that we introduced an artificial, linearized version of 
the FLB. This approach simplified the description of the bias by making it depend on just one 
parameter z. This in turn enabled us to demonstrate the profit opportunity of the cheater to 
increase in z, implying that the existence of the FLB tends to protect the outsiders. But what 
we found empirically was not that the FLB unequivocally diminishes but rather that its pattern 
changes. It changes to a diminished bias across the favorite categories but becomes steeper as 
one approaches the longshots. This in turn implies that our stylized description of the FLB 
may not have been appropriate in the first place. Still, the difference in the patterns of the FLB 
we found across subsamples 1 and 2 are striking. This change of patterns suggests that the 
cheating model has its merits but that other factors like biased probability estimates especially 
for longshots also may play a role.
Still another problem lies in the lack of control for other cheating incentives. For example, 
Fernie and Metcalf (1999) suggested that a jockey believed to have underperformed may 
loose future employment opportunities. However, jockeys approaching their retirements may 
not be concerned with their labor market reputation any more and could therefore feel 
stronger inclinations to cheat. So a control for future employment opportunities would be 
appropriate. What is more, we have not even controls for the incentive contracts of the 
jockeys covered by our data. A jockey that receives a high fraction of the prize money may be 
less inclined to slow his horse down than a jockey getting rather flat pay. On the other hand, a 
jockey’s incentive for not winning should depend on the combination of compensation for 
winning and profit opportunities in the betting market. While we have data on the total betting 
volume at the tracks under observation, there are additional betting opportunities offered by 
bookmakers for which we have no information. This implies that we can not properly estimate 
the profit opportunities offered by cheating combined with betting simultaneously around the 
world.
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6. Conclusion
The model presented in this paper suggests that the FLB may be a rational response of 
uninformed outsiders to simple cheating opportunities by insiders. While the FLB may be 
induced by other forces as well, the FLB should be expected to be more pronounced in races 
offering a cheating opportunity as opposed to other races.
We found anecdotal evidence of market manipulation taking place all over the world. Horse 
doping, “sponging”, and race fixing seem to be quite common techniques of manipulation and 
the evidence suggests that some of these activities are unequivocally due to profit
opportunities in the betting markets. While we found little direct anecdotal evidence of horses 
made to run slower, our betting market analysis showed a different picture. We found the 
pattern of the FLB to change significantly as the opportunity of cheating is removed. Our 
finding suggests that slowing horses down is a realistic option for insiders and that outsiders 
act accordingly.
On the other hand it should be remembered that the model presented above is only a first 
effort to understand the possible effects of cheating. It is only one technique of cheating that 
has been analyzed while there may be a whole array of other cheating opportunities. The 
anecdotal evidence provided here indeed suggests that more theoretical work on cheating 
techniques should be worthwhile. Especially models of horse doping to make them faster and 
models of race fixing should be interesting.
There are also interesting empirical questions that remain unanswered. For example, we were 
not able to control for additional incentives to cheat nor were we able to control for 
countervailing incentives not to. Last but not least we think that it should be worthwhile to 
have a closer look at the dynamics of cheating. As suggested above, making a good horse 
slower in one race improves its win bet profitability in the next. It should therefore be 
interesting to watch out for conspicuous patterns of a given horse’s performances over time. 
However, this approach would require individual identification of horses, jockeys, and maybe 
trainers. And it would require data sets that are much larger than ours to have enough 
individuals that can be followed over time. Maybe the data set used by Snowberg and Wolfers 
(2006) would meet these criteria. 
Appendix
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A) Sources of information on drugs used in horse doping
http://www.theage.com.au/news/Horse-Racing/The-drugs-challenge/2004/12/27/1103996492071.html
http://www.horsesport.org/mcp/PDFS/Prohibitedsubstances.pdf
http://www.horsesport.org/mcp/PDFS/EADMCR-2006.pdf
http://www.berlinonline.de/berliner-zeitung/archiv/.bin/dump.fcgi/1999/0504/sport/0040/index.html
B) Sources of information on unusual drugs like vodka, Viagra, and baking powder
http://www.research.uky.edu/odyssey/spring98/sponging.html
http://grg51.typepad.com/steroid_nation/2007/01/advances_in_hor.html
http://www.nypost.com/seven/02052007/news/columnists/race_fix_scandal_columnists_murray_weiss.htm
http://www.castelligasse.at/Politik/Doping/doping.htm
C) Sources of information on horses manipulated to run faster
C1: Horses having manipulated with ACP in Plumpton, England, 2001 and 2002
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/other_sports/horse_racing/1959450.stm#
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4158/is_20010202/ai_n14364521
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4158/is_20010202/ai_n14364521
C2: Former jockey and trainer was claimed to have doped 23 horses in 1990; 10-year 
disqualification
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/other_sports/horse_racing/2491017.stm
C3: One of Australia's most respected trainers being investigated for the alleged use of illegal 
anabolic steroids in 45 cases, 1999.
http://www.abc.net.au/am/stories/s37898.htm
C4: A horse owned by gentleman jockey George Herbert Bostwick was found to have been 
stimulated for a race and won it, USA 1933.
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,753989,00.html
C5: Horse was manipulated with a bicarb stomach drench, England, 2004
http://www.theage.com.au/news/Horse-Racing/The-drugs-challenge/2004/12/27/1103996492071.html
D) Sources of information on horses manipulated to run slower
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D1: Favorite horse delivered unexpected poor racing result. As a consequence a doping 
control for negative doping was administered with no result till now, Germany, 2006
http://www.abendblatt.de/daten/2006/09/05/606907.html
D2: Sponges found in the nostrils of different horses; USA, 1997.
http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/sun/1997/jun/16/506000899.html?sponge
D3: The vetenary found a sponge in the nostril of a horse which finished 3rd, USA, 1933.
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,753989,00.html
D4: Officials failed to catch the person who placed sponges in the nasal passages of eight 
horses, USA, 1999.
http://www.research.uky.edu/odyssey/spring98/sponging.html
D4: Jockey was blackmailed to hold his horse back and finished fourth. Germany, 1999.
http://www.berlinonline.de/berliner-zeitung/archiv/.bin/dump.fcgi/1999/0504/sport/0040/index.html
E) Sources of information on race fixing schemes
E1: Jockeys suspended and fined for race fixing. USA, 2006. 
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/horses/2006-04-03-meadowlands-arrests_x.htm
http://www.boston.com/sports/other_sports/horse_racing/articles/2006/04/03/police_suspect_race_fixing_at_me
adowlands/
http://www.boston.com/sports/other_sports/horse_racing/articles/2006/04/12/five_suspended_in_race_fixing_ca
se/
E2: Bookmaker was informed by jockeys that their horses would not win. England, 2006.
http://www.allhorseracing.com/thoroughbred-horseracing-news.php?id=1111
http://www.thehra.org/doc.php?id=41656
E2: Bookmaker was informed by jockeys that their horses would not win. England, 2006.
http://www.allhorseracing.com/thoroughbred-horseracing-news.php?id=1111
http://www.thehra.org/doc.php?id=41656
E3: Group of jockeys sentenced for race fixing over a couple of years, USA, 2001.
http://www.thoroughbredtimes.com/national-news/2001/May/01/Jockeys-sentenced-in-Penn-National-
scandal.aspx
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http://espn.go.com/horse/news/2000/1215/952050.html
E4: One horse was exchanged for another. England, 1974.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/other_sports/horse_racing/2295403.stm
http://archives.tcm.ie/irishexaminer/2004/09/02/story269069470.asp
E5: The Mafia fixed races for many years by positive and negative doping and collaborating 
with jockeys. Italy, 1990s.
http://www.berlinonline.de/berliner-zeitung/archiv/.bin/dump.fcgi/2001/0921/vermischtes/0067/index.html
E6: Other sources of information on race fixing activities
http://sport.guardian.co.uk/horseracing/comment/0,,2016749,00.html
http://www.thehra.org/doc.php?id=44468
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/horses/2006-12-20-tampa-bay-downs_x.htm
http://www.sptimes.com/2006/12/20/Sports/Seven_jockeys_are_ban.shtml
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940CE3D8123BF934A25751C0A964948260&n=Top%2fRefer
ence%2fTimes%20Topics%2fSubjects%2fH%2fHorse%20Racing
http://www.allhorseracing.com/thoroughbred-horseracing-news.php?id=699
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940CE3D8123BF934A25751C0A964948260&n=Top%2fRefer
ence%2fTimes%20Topics%2fSubjects%2fH%2fHorse%20Racing
http://www.allhorseracing.com/thoroughbred-horseracing-news.php?id=699
REFERENCES
Ali, Mukhtar M. (1977): Probability and utility estimates for racetrack bettors, in: Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 85, pp. 803-815.
Asch, Peter/Malkiel, Burton G./Quandt, Richard E. (1982): Racetrack Betting and Informed 
Behaviour, in: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 10, pp. 187-194.
Bird, Ron, McCrae, Michael, Beggs, John (1987): Are Gamblers Really Risk Takers? 
Australian Economic Papers, Vol. 49, pp. 237-253. 
Bruce, Alistair C./Johnson, Johnnie E.V. (2000): Investigating the Roots of the Favorite-
Longshot Bias: An analysis of decision-making by supply- and demand-side agents in 
parallel betting markets, in: Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, Vol. 13, pp. 413-430.
Busche, Kelly (1994): Efficient Market Results in an Asian Setting, in: Hausch, Donald B./Lo, 
Victor S.Y./Ziemba, William T. (eds.): Racetrack Betting Markets, Academic Press 1994, pp. 
615-616.
Busche, Kelly/Hall, Cristopher D. (1988): An exception to the risk preference anomaly, in: 
Journal of Business, Vol. 61, pp. 337-346.
Page 24 of 27
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
25
Cain, Michael/Peel, David/Law, David (2002): Skewness as an explanation of gambling by 
locally risk averse agents, in: Applied Economics Letters, Vol. 9, pp. 1025-1028.
Coleman, Les (2004): New light on the longshot bias, in: Applied Economics, Vol. 36, pp. 
315-326.
Dowie, Jack A. (1976): On the Efficiency and Equity of Betting Markets, in: Economica, Vol. 
43, pp. 139-150.
Friedman, Milton/Savage, Leonhard (1948): The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, 
in: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 56, pp. 279-304.
Fernie, Sue, Metcalf, David (2001):It’s not what you pay it’s the way that you pay it and 
that’s what gets results: Jockeys’ pay and performance, in: Labour, Vol. 13, pp. 385-411.
Gandar, John M., Zuber, Richard A., Johnson, R. Stafford (2001): Searching for the 
favourite-longshot bias down under: An examination of the New Zealand pari-mutuel 
betting market, in: Applied Economics, Vol. 98, pp 1621-1629.
Golec, Joseph, Tamarkin, Maurry (1998): Bettors Love Skewness, Not Risk, at the Horse 
Track, in: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 106, pp 205-225
Gramm, Marshall (2005): Betting Market Efficiency at Premiere Racetracks, in: 
Southwestern Economic Review, Vol. 32, pp. 85-92.
Griffith, Richard M. (1949): Odds Adjustments by American Horse Race Bettors, in: 
American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 62, pp. 290-294.
Hausch, Donald B./Ziemba, William T. (1990): Arbitrage Strategies for Cross-Track Betting 
on Major Horse Races, in: Journal of Business, Vol. 63, pp. 61-78.
Hausch, Donald B./Ziemba, William T. (1995): Efficiency in Sports and Lottery Markets, in: 
Jarrow, Robert A./Maksimovic, Vojislav/Ziemba, William T. (eds.): Finance - Handbooks in 
Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 9, pp. 545-580. 
Henery, Robert J. (1985): On the average Probability of losing Bets on Horses with given 
Starting Price Odds, in: Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Vol. 148, pp. 342-349.
Higgins, A.J. (2006): From ancient Greece to modern Athens: 3000 years of doping in 
competition horses, in: Journal of Veterinary Pharmacology and Therapeutics, Vol. 29, pp 
4-8. 
Johnson, Johnnie E./Bruce, Alistair C. (1993): Gluck’s Second Law: An empirical 
investigation of horserace betting in early and late races, in: Psychological Reports, Vol. 72, 
pp. 1251-1258.
Jullien, Bruno/Salanié, Bernard (2000): Estimating Preferences under Risk: The Case of 
Racetrack Bettors, in: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, pp. 503-530.
Page 25 of 27
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
26
Kahneman, Daniel/Tversky, Amos (1979): Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under 
Risk, Econometrica, Vol. 47, pp. 263-292
Kopelman, Richard E./Minkin, Betsy L. (1991): Toward a psychology of parimutuel behavior: 
test of Gluck's Law's, in: Psychological Reports, Vol. 68, pp. 701-702.
Law, David, Peel, David A. (2002): Insider Trading, Herding Behaviour and Market Plungers 
in the British Horse-race Betting Market, in: Economica, Vol. 69, pp. 327-338.
Markowitz, Harry (1952): The Utility of Wealth, in: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 56, 
pp. 151-158. 
McGlothlin, William H. (1956): Stability of Choices among Uncertain Alternatives, in: 
American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 69, pp. 604-616.
Quandt, Richard E. (1986): Betting and Equilibrium, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 101, pp. 201-207.
Sauer, Raymond D. (1998): The economics of wagering markets, in: Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol. 36, pp. 2021-2064.
Schnytzer, Adi/Shilony, Yuval (1995): Inside Information in a betting market, in: Economic 
Journal, Vol. 105, pp. 963-971.
Shin, Hyun Song (1991): Optimal betting odds against insider traders, in: Economic Journal, 
Vol. 101, pp. 1179-1185.
Shin, Hyun Song (1992): Prices of state contingent claims with insider traders, and the 
favourite-longshot bias, in: Economic Journal, Vol. 102, pp. 426-435.
Shin, Hyun Song (1993): Measuring the incidence of insider trading in a market for state-
contingent claims. In: Economic Journal, Vol. 103, 1141-1153
Smith, Michael A., Paton, David, Williams, Leighton Vaughan (2006): Market Efficiency in 
Person-to-Person Betting, Economica, Vol. 73, pp. 673-689. 
Snyder, Wayne W. (1978): Horse Racing: Testing the Efficient Markets Model, in: Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 33, pp. 1109-1118.
Snowberg, Erik/Wolfers, Justin (2006): Explaining the Favorite-Longshot Bias: Is it Risk-
Love, or Misperceptions? In: Working Paper, available at 
http://cbdr.cmu.edu/seminar/Wolfers.pdf, download Feb. 13, 2007.
Sobel, Russel S./Raines, Travis (2003): An examination of the empirical derivatives of the 
favourite-longshot bias in racetrack betting, in: Applied Economics, Vol. 35. pp. 371-385.
Swidler, Steve/Shaw, Ron (1995): Racetrack Wagering and the "Uninformed" Bettor: A Study 
of Market Efficiency, in: Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 35, pp. 305-
314.
Page 26 of 27
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
27
Thaler, Richard H. (1985): Mental accounting and consumer choice, in: Marketing Science, 
Vol. 4, pp. 199-214.
Thaler, Richard H./Johnson, Eric J. (1990): Gambling with the house money and trying to 
break even: the effects of prior outcomes on risky choice, in: Management Science, Vol. 36, 
pp. 643-660.
Thaler, Richard H./Ziemba, William T. (1988): Parimutuel Betting Markets: Racetracks and 
Lotteries, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 2, pp. 161-174.
Tuckwell, R.H. (1983): The thoroughbred gambling market: efficiency, equity and related 
issues, in: Australian Economic Papers, June, pp. 106-118.
Tversky, Amos/Kahneman, Daniel (1992): Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative 
Representation of Uncertainty in: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Vol. 5, pp. 297-324.
Williams, Leighton Vaughan /Paton, David (1997): Why is there a favourite-longshot bias in 
British racetrack betting markets? in: Economic Journal, Vol. 107, pp. 150-158.
Walls, W. David/Busche, Kelly (2002): Breakage, turnover and betting market efficiency: 
New evidence from Japanese horse tracks, in Vaughan Williams, Leighton (Ed.), The 
Economics of Gambling, London, Routledge
Weitzman, Martin (1965): Utility Analysis and Group Behavior: An Empirical Study, in: 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 73, pp. 18-26.
Winter, Stefan/Kukuk, Martin (2006): Risk love and the favorite-longshot bias: Evidence from 
German Harness Horse Racing, in: Schmalenbachs Business Review, Vol. 58, pp 349-364.
Page 27 of 27
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
